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“Law Exclusion Zones”: Mega-Events as Sites 






“Laws and principles are not for the times when there is no temptation: 
they are for such moments as this, when body and soul rise in mutiny 
against their rigour; stringent are they; inviolate they shall be. If at my 
individual convenience I might break them, what would be their worth?” 




In the Rio de Janeiro community of Vila Harmonia, nestled amidst the 
beachfront high-rises of the city’s growing middle and upper classes and 
future sites of the 2016 Olympic Games, residents awoke to eviction notices 
ordering them out of their long-time homes within “zero days.”2  At 2014 
World Cup sites throughout Brazil, construction workers are being advised 
that their normal collective bargaining rights have been suspended because 
of the urgency of the projects.3  Traditional food-sellers in one World Cup 
host city, Belo Horizonte, were summarily evicted from the stadium-
adjacent area where they held the right to work for years,4 and where gen-
                                                           
1. Yale Law School, J.D. 2013. I would thank the many mega-event host city residents and 
members of the Comitês Populares da Copa who generously shared their time for this Note. 
 Many thanks to Dr. Christopher Gaffney at the Universidade Federal Fluminense in Niterói, 
Brazil and attendees at the 2013 Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting, who 
provided invaluable feedback on early drafts; and to the Woodrow Wilson School of Public 
and International Affairs at Princeton University, which provided funding for the job that laid 
the groundwork for this Note. 
2. Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janiero, Secretaria Municipal de Conservação e Serviços 
Públicos, 19o Gerência de Conservação [Rio de Janeiro City Government, Municipal Secretary 
for Conservation and Public Services, 19th Administration for Conservation], Edital 
SC/SUBEC/CGC/3aCRC/19aGC no 000271/2010 (2010), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/101581426/Notificacao-de-Zero-Dias-da-Prefeitura-do-Rio-
Contra-a-Vila-Harmonia. 
3. ARTICULAÇÃO NACIONAL DOS COMITÊS POPULARES DA COPA [NATIONAL NETWORK OF 
POPULAR COMMITTEES ON THE WORLD CUP, hereinafter NETWORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES], 
MEGAEVENTOS E VIOLAÇÕES DE DIREITOS HUMANOS NO BRASIL (2d ed.) 37-41 (2012), available at 
http://www.portalpopulardacopa.org.br/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=198:do
ssi%C3%AA-nacional-de-viola%C3%A7%C3%B5es-de-direitos-humanos. 
4. Os Sem Estádio [The Stadium-less], AGÊNCIA PÚBLICA (Sept. 14, 2012), 
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erations of families have gone for a pre-game churrasco.5  In another city, 
Natal, mandatory environmental analyses have been ignored as the city 
speeds ahead with transportation projects that threaten the environment 
around the city’s world-famous beach dunes.6  These decisions and scores 
of others have been made behind closed doors, without normal participa-
tory processes.  In 2013, the Secretary General of the Fédération Interna-
tionale de Football Association (“FIFA”) said, tellingly, “[L]ess democracy 
is sometimes better for organizing a World Cup.”7  With major sporting 
events approaching, the official narrative seems to go, there simply is not 
time for the human rights protections enshrined in national and interna-
tional law.8   
In Brazil, the upcoming World Cup and Olympics offer a pretext for 
domestic and international elite interests, supported by international sport-
ing organizations and their sponsors, to fast-track highly profitable projects 
by circumventing normal participatory processes and human rights protec-
tions.  In this respect, Brazil’s event preparation processes are not unique—
in fact, they are common enough to have been predicted9 by regular ob-
servers of “mega-events,” or large-scale cultural events of international sig-
nificance.10  London’s 2012 Olympic Games, for example, made headlines 
for their “brand exclusion zones,” in which local businesses were banned 
from using an artist’s rendering of the Olympic rings, or even an innocuous 
phrase like “two thousand twelve,” and non-sponsor vendors were pushed 
out of their usual workplaces.11   
Given the enormous amounts of money at stake;12 the pressures from 
                                                                                                                                         
http://www.apublica.org/2012/09/os-sem-estadio/. 
5. Interview with Fidélis Alcântara, Comitê Popular dos Atingidos pela Copa 2014 – BH, in 
Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil (July 12, 2012). 
6. See, e.g., Vinicius Konchinski, Obra da Copa pode poluir ponto turístico e levar esgoto para praias 
de Natal [Construction for the World Cup may pollute tourist site and carry sewage to Natal’s beaches], 
UOL ESPORTE (Jan. 11, 2012), http://esporte.uol.com.br/futebol/copa-2014/ultimas-
noticias/2012/01/11/sem-estudo-de-impactos-ambientais-obra-da-copa-pode-poluir-ponto-
turistico-de-natal.htm. 
7. Soccer: Less Democracy Makes for an Easier World Cup—Valcke, REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-soccer-fifa-idUSBRE93N18F20130424. 
8. See NETWORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES, supra note 3. 
9. See, e.g., Julian Cheyne, Winners and Losers in Rio, GAMESMONITOR (Oct. 6, 2009), 
http://www.gamesmonitor.org.uk/node/864. 
10. MAURICE ROCHE, MEGA-EVENTS AND MODERNITY: OLYMPICS AND EXPOS IN THE GROWTH OF 
GLOBAL CULTURE 1 (2000). 
11. See, e.g., Ira Boudway, Don’t Mess With the Lord of the Olympic Rings, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Jun. 14, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-06-14/dont-
mess-with-the-lord-of-the-olympic-rings. 
12. Mega-events often involve public subsidies, public losses, and private profits.  See, e.g., Fer-
ran Brunet, Análisis del impacto económico de los Juegos Olímpicos [Analysis of the economic impact 
of the Olympic Games], in MOSAICO OLÍMPICO 219, 219 (Emilio Fernández Peña, et al. eds., 2011), 
available at http://ceo.uab.es/2010/docs/C40912_2.pdf.  For the 2002 Olympic Games in the 
United States, for example, the federal government poured $1.5 billion dollars into the host 
city of Salt Lake City, Utah, much of which went to “bankrolling subsidies, sweetheart deals, 
and giveaways for land developers and other well-connected Utahans.”  Tim Murphy, Mitt 
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international organizations and domestic politicians eager to put on a 
smooth, orderly, and impressive event; and the massive media hype, mega-
events—and particularly sporting events—create precisely the sort of per-
ceived “emergency” moments in which rights abuses become more likely, 
and legal protections are therefore all the more essential.  And yet, when 
the mega-event juggernaut rolls into town, regular laws, rights-balancing 
considerations, and supposedly inviolable constitutional protections are of-
ten forgotten.  Using the case study of Brazil, host of the 2014 World Cup 
and 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games, this Note argues that mega-events 
create pretexts for the implementation of “law exclusion zones”—spaces, 
both physical and metaphorical, in which normal legal processes are jetti-
soned and new, exceptional legal regimes take their place—and that these 
regimes often undermine normal human rights protections, allowing a few 
to profit at the expense of the many. 
This paper proceeds in three parts.  Part I describes how mega-event 
boosters use rhetorical strategies and transnational alliances to create a pol-
icy environment in which legal exceptionalism is acceptable and even en-
couraged, and how those special legal regimes undermine accountability 
and contribute to the exclusion of citizen voices.  Part II offers case studies 
drawn from Brazil to illustrate how fast-track decision-making, citizen ex-
clusion, and other violations of participatory rights create a legal regime in 
which a host of rights can be violated with impunity.  Finally, Part III con-
cludes with some recommendations for strengthening legal protections for 
human rights during mega-event preparations and implementation. 
 
 
I. WHEN THE WORLD ARRIVES: HOW ELITE INTERESTS USE MEGA-EVENTS TO 
REFRAME THE POLITICAL DEBATE 
 
The “law exclusion zones” being carved out in Brazil’s host cities are 
part of a broader global pattern in which legal exceptionalism is tolerated, 
and even encouraged, as countries prepare for and host mega-events.  Such 
mega-events range from major international policy conferences to global 
sporting competitions to commercial exhibitions.  While specific policy con-
siderations may differ from one to the other, in the age of globalization, 
mega-events have become an increasingly important part of statecraft, giv-
ing countries opportunities to show off their “world-class” cities and city 
governments opportunities to negotiate for resources and support from the 
central government.13  British sociologist Maurice Roche, who described 
mega-events as “some of modern society’s great ‘parades’ and ‘shows,’”14 
defines them as: 
 
. . . large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) 
events which have a dramatic character, mass popular ap-
                                                           
13. Greg Andranovich, Matthew J. Burbank & Charles H. Heying, Olympic Cities: Lessons 
Learned from Mega-Event Politics, 23 J. URB. AFFAIRS 113, 114 (2001). 
14. ROCHE (2000), supra note 10, at 1. 
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peal and international significance.  They are typically or-
ganised by variable combinations of national governmental 
and international non-governmental organisations and 
thus can be said to be important elements in “official” ver-
sions of public culture.15 
 
This Part first describes how mega-events function as sites of legal ex-
ceptionalism.  It next describes how mega-events, and particularly large-
scale sporting events, are marketed to citizens of host cities in three interre-
lated ways: as a source of civic pride, as an opportunity for economic 
growth, and as a chance to modernize the host city.  It concludes with an 
overview of how the support and coercive power of the international com-
munity can provide an additional advantage for local elites within the do-
mestic debate.  It argues that the public promises made to citizens about 
mega-events are often hollow—the benefits that do accrue are concentrated 
in the hands of a few well-connected developers, while the promised urban 
transformation pushes working class citizens even further toward the 
physical and social margins of their own cities. Crucially, however, those 
promises, combined with the international community’s support for rapid 
transformation, provide a policy environment in which rapid and normally 
unfeasible legislative changes can take place, laying the groundwork for re-
gimes of legal exceptionalism. 
 
 A. Mega-Events as Sites of Legal Exceptionalism 
 
Mega-events serve as both literal and figurative sites of legal exception-
alism.  For example, the areas around mega-event venues are sometimes 
designated special legal zones, in which the law of the state is replaced by 
special legal regimes, as was the case with the London Olympics’ “brand 
exclusion zones.”16  In effect, mega-event sites often function as tiny embas-
sies—except that instead of being governed by the law of another state un-
der a reciprocal relationship, as diplomatic law would allow, they are gov-
erned (non-reciprocally) by the law of a corporate or intergovernmental 
entity.  They also become figurative sites of legal exceptionalism, fostering a 
sense that “bigger” concerns about national pride justify laws that differ 
from what would normally be acceptable.  For example, mega-events might 
be used to justify free speech bans that ordinarily would be questionable,17 
evict or displace people without normal due process protections,18 fast-track 
construction deals without full transparency,19 or authorize the use of brutal 
                                                           
15. Id. 
16. See, e.g., Boudway, supra note 11. 
17. Id. 
18. See, e.g., Solomon J. Greene, Staged Cities: Mega-events, Slum Clearance, and Global Capital, 6 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 161 (2003). 
19. See, e.g., James Surowiecki, Corruption and Construction at the Sochi Olympics, NEW YORKER 
(Feb. 10, 2014), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2014/02/10/140210ta_talk_surowiecki. 
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methods to quickly squash ongoing crime problems.20 
The special laws are made possible at least in part because citizens are 
often shut out of the conversation, leaving civil society groups to—at best—
participate in harm-mitigation, rather than constructive discussions about 
the mega-event legacy that citizens want for their city.21  As the following 
sections discuss, such fast-track lawmaking and authoritarianism are facili-
tated by rhetoric about civic pride, economic growth, and modernization, 
as well as transnational elite alliances, and typically advance the commer-
cial interests of a small group of developers and other well-connected host-
city elites. 
 
B. Mega-Events and Public Opinion 
A landmark Brazilian civil society report on human rights abuses in 
mega-event planning opened with a quote from Michel, a man whose home 
and community were razed to make way for Olympics construction pro-
jects in the Rio de Janeiro neighborhood of Restringa.  Michel lamented: 
 
I feel like such a sucker, because when Brazil won these damn 
Olympics I was in my car on the Linha Amarela [expressway], 
honking like a fool.  Now I’m paying for it.  This is the World Cup?  
This is the Olympic spirit?22 
 
Most of us likely empathize with Michel’s early enthusiasm for his 
city’s winning bid.23  The Olympics enjoy enormous global goodwill, and 
winning a bid can be the source of tremendous municipal and national 
pride.  After Brazil was awarded the 2016 Olympics, then-President Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva said (“tearfully,” the press observed): 
 
This is a victory for 19 million [Brazilian] souls, a victory for all of 
Latin America, a victory for the Olympics. . . .  Brazil today won her 
international citizenship; we broke the last barrier of prejudice.24 
 
A mega-event done well can indeed enhance the global profile and 
                                                           
20. Jens Glüsing, Maik Grossekathöfer & Horand Knaup, “Shoot Them in the Head”: World Cup 
Hosts Brazil and South Africa Crack Down on Crime, DER SPIEGEL ONLINE INTERNATIONAL (Nov. 
6, 2009), http:// www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,659427,00.html. 
21. See, e.g., CENTRE ON HOUSING RIGHTS & EVICTIONS [COHRE], FAIR PLAY FOR HOUSING 
RIGHTS: MEGA-EVENTS, OLYMPIC GAMES AND HOUSING RIGHTS 78 (2007), available at 
http://www.cohre.org/sites/default/files/fair_play_for_housing_rights_2007_0.pdf.  
22. NETWORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES, supra note 3, at 9. 
23. In Chicago, for example, which had advanced along with Rio de Janeiro to the final round 
of candidate cities for the 2016 Olympics, people with “Chicago 2016” signs gathered to await 
the announcement of the host city and expressed shock and disbelief when their city was not 
named.  Monica Davey, Ready for an Olympic Party, Chicago Loses Its Date, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/03/sports/03chicago.html. 
24. Lula exalta vitória do povo brasileiro com a escolha do Rio 2016 [Lula praises victory of the Brazilian 
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prestige of a city.25  But the groundswell of civic pride that accompanies a 
winning mega-event bid, and particularly a successful Olympics bid, can 
also produce opportunities to manipulate public opinion.  After all, in the 
face of such popular enthusiasm, few politicians believe it would be a win-
ning proposition to interrupt the celebrations in the streets and say, “Hold 
up—maybe this isn’t such a victory after all.”26  Much like “national secu-
rity” can become a political trump card to enact sweeping changes in do-
mestic law in the aftermath of a major terrorist event,27 “civic pride” and the 
host city’s image can be used to advance what in other circumstances might 
be highly unpopular laws.28 
These efforts are often supported by pro-events media coverage, par-
ticularly for sporting events.29  Global athletic events are inherently mass 
media events,30 and they are highly lucrative for the news organizations 
with rights to cover them.31  As a result, getting media buy-in for mega-
events boosterism can be almost effortless and often contributes to the nar-
rative of civic pride that lays the groundwork for public support of substan-
tial legal changes. 
 
C. Mega-Events as Development Projects 
 
In addition to sources of civic and national pride, mega-events are often 
sold as development projects that will bring resources, jobs, and both short- 
and long-term economic benefits to the host city.32  Just as citizens might be 
willing to approve tax breaks for a major corporation that promises jobs, 
the promise of economic development provides an incentive for allowing 
special and favorable rules for mega-events and their associated develop-
                                                           
25. See, e.g., London 2012: Games garners positive press for London, BBC (Dec. 31, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-19157709. 
26. In some potential candidate cities, political leaders have emerged as opponents to proposed 
mega-events, but this was generally in response to pre-existing domestic political resistance to 
the proposed event.  For example, Richard Lamm, a Colorado legislator who later became 
governor, emerged as a leading voice against Denver, Colorado’s bid for the 1976 Olympics.  
Voters rejected the city’s proposed bid, which the press observed was “really a referendum on 
spending and growth in Colorado.”  Colorado voters reject 1976 Winter Olympics, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN NEWS (Nov. 8, 1972).  Crucially, the bid was first put to voters, a step often not 
taken when cities bid for, or agree to host, mega-events. 
27. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity: Torture and the State of Constitutional Cul-
ture, 61 SMU L. REV. 221, 224 (2008) (“Necessity arguments claim that in particular circum-
stances officials may undertake exceptional actions to achieve their legitimate goals, such as 
protecting national security, that would otherwise be prohibited if the normal rule of law gov-
erned during normal conditions.”). 
28. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 18, at 165-66. 
29. See, e.g., BRAD R. HUMPHREYS & DENNIS R. HOWARD EDS., THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS viii (2008) 
(“ . . . the popular press contains many accounts of large economic benefits that these events 
generate.”). 
30. See, e.g., Maurice Roche, Olympic and Sport Mega-Events as Media Events: Reflections on the 
Globalisation paradigm, in THE GLOBAL NEXUS ENGAGED: SIXTH  INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM FOR 
OLYMPIC RESEARCH 1 (2002). 
31. See, e.g., Callum Murray, Olympic Games Set to Break $8bn Revenues Barrier in Four-year Cycle 
Ending with London 2012, 26 SPORTCAL 6, 7 (2012). 
32. See, e.g., ANDREW ZIMBALIST, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF MEGA 
SPORTING EVENTS (2012). 
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ers.33  In some respects, the growth promises are accurate; for example, 
studies suggest that mega-events help host cities gain an influx of resources 
from the central government relative to non-host cities in the same country, 
and that this “showcase advantage” may be particularly important in peri-
ods of economic recession and resource scarcity.34  But the ultimate balance 
sheet is not always positive,35 nor are the purported growth strategies al-
ways focused on sustained opportunities for income generation.  Even 
when net growth does occur, the balance sheet gains do not always trans-
late into opportunity for the average resident.36 
Even domestic interests traditionally aligned with historically disen-
franchised communities may rally behind a mega-event in the hope that it 
will catalyze national and international support to address domestic prob-
lems.  In South Africa, for example, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former 
President Nelson Mandela rallied behind the campaign for the 2010 World 
Cup, in part because they believed it might shed light on the country’s 
housing problems and provide a focal point for national unity and recon-
ciliation.37  Yet, in practice, more of the poor were displaced from their 
homes38 and workplaces39 than were helped, as has happened in countless 
other countries that have hosted mega-events.40  Once organizers transition 
into the planning and implementation phases, little effort is typically made 
to ensure that the high rhetoric of economic development is coupled with 
real opportunities for ordinary residents.  “Relying on a logic of ‘trickle-
down’ economics, ‘city leaders and event organizers typically claim that 
mega-events help to address the economic and cultural needs and rights of 
local citizens, regardless of whether the citizens have actually been con-
sulted about or involved in their production.’”41  This pattern of front-end 
promises paired with a lack of back-end accountability allows mega-event 
boosters to harness popular support during the preparation phase of a 
mega-event, even as they strategically allocate gains to well-connected in-
terests.42 
 
D. World-Class Cities for Some: Mega-Events and Urban 
                                                           
33. See, e.g., Harry H. Hiller, Mega-Events, Urban Boosterism and Growth Strategies: An Analysis of 
the Objectives and Legitimations of the Cape Town 2004 Olympic Bid, 42 INT’L J. URBAN & REGIONAL 
RES. 439, 454 (2000). 
34. Andranovich, Burbank & Heying, supra note 13, at 113-115. 
35. See, e.g., Andrew Zimbalist, Is It Worth It? 47 FIN. & DEV. 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2010/03/zimbalist.htm. 
36. See, e.g., ZIMBALIST (2012), supra note 32 (arguing that mega-events frequently result in 
“overbuilding” that is mismatched with the city’s long-term needs, and that empirical evi-
dence suggests that tourism and jobs do not actually grow as a result of hosting). 
37. Hiller, supra note 33, at 452. 
38. Greene, supra note 18, at 185, n.194. 
39. Nora Wintour, World Class Cities for All Campaign – “This World Cup is not for us poor 
women,” in AGENDA: EMPOWERING WOMEN FOR GEND. EQUITY. 97 (2010). 
40. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 18. 
41. Id. at 180 (quoting Maurice Roche, Mega-Events and Urban Policy, 21 ANNALS OF TOURISM 
RES. 1, 2 (1994)). 
42. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 12. 
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Transformation 
To complement promises of economic growth, particularly in the host 
cities of middle-income countries like Brazil and South Africa, residents of 
mega-event host cities are often promised public works projects and policy 
reforms that will transform and modernize their cities.  For example, at the 
same time that President Lula celebrated Brazil’s victory in securing the 
2016 Olympics, he noted: “People said it wasn’t possible to have the Games 
because we have poor children, because we have favelas.  We have to fix all 
of that, without a doubt.  We know that we still have a lot of work ahead of 
us.”43 
The message implicit in Lula’s pledge was that the state would use the 
Olympics to motivate progressive social reforms: poor children would be 
lifted up, and favelas integrated into the “official” city and given services.  
But past experiences in other mega-event host cities suggest that cities often 
choose another path to presenting a purportedly “modern” face.  That path 
is making poverty—and the poor—invisible.  Past mega-events around the 
world have motivated public officials to tear down slums and informal set-
tlements.44  They have been used to justify busing people living in home-
lessness out of town, far from the places familiar to them.45  Similarly, 
mega-events have displaced small businesspeople who sell their goods in 
public spaces.  For example, in 1992, street vendors in Santo Domingo, Do-
minican Republic, were pushed to the periphery in advance of the city’s 
massive 500th anniversary celebration of Christopher Columbus, costing 
many of them their client bases and sources of livelihood.46  More recently, 
street vendors from historic vending sites around South Africa were dis-
placed in advance of the 2010 World Cup.47  The pattern is so predictable 
that StreetNet, an international network of street vendors that began in 
South Africa, recently launched a global campaign called “World Class Cit-
                                                           
43. Lula praises victory, supra note 24. 
44. See, e.g., Kris Olds, Urban Mega-Events, Evictions and Housing Rights: The Canadian Case, 1 
CURRENT ISSUES IN TOURISM 2, 2-3 (1998) (analyzing housing impacts of three Canadian mega-
events and noting that evictions “should be viewed as an expected result” of mega-events, 
with a policy focus on mitigation of the impact, rather than unrealistic total elimination); Sarah 
E. Hager, Zimbabwe: Why the United Nations, State, and Non-State Actors Failed to Effectively Regu-
late Mugabe’s Policy of Internal Displacement, 37 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 221, 250-51 (2007) 
(“‘[B]eautification projects immediately prior to international events are one of the most com-
mon justifications for slum clearance programs.’ Prior to the IMF and World Bank conference 
in Bangkok in 1991, Thailand forcibly removed more than 2,000 slum dwellers from the area 
around the convention center.  When the same convention convened in 1976 in Manila, 400 
families experienced the same forcible removal to obfuscate the existence of these slum resi-
dents.  In the five years preceding the 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul, 48,000 buildings that 
housed 720,000 people were demolished to make way for redevelopment.  ‘Ninety percent of 
the 720,000 evictees did not receive replacement housing within the redevelopment site.’” (in-
ternal citations omitted)).  
45. See, e.g., Jacqueline Kennelly & Paul Watt, Sanitizing Public Space in Olympic Host Cities: The 
Spatial Experiences of Marginalized Youth in 2010 Vancouver and 2012 London, 45 SOCIOLOGY 765, 
771 (2011). 
46. Greene, supra note 18. 
47. Wintour, supra note 39. 
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ies for All” in response to the routine mega-event-related evictions of street 
vendors, who rely on daily work to provide a livelihood for their families.48 
Many mega-events capture enormous levels of international attention, 
with host cities naturally eager to put their best foot forward on the interna-
tional stage.  “Mega-events are intended to attract tourist revenues and 
more important, national and international media recognition for the host 
city.  . . . [M]aking a debut on the world stage requires looking the part.”49  
But there are competing images of what that means, and the mega-events 
process reveals divisions within the host city about visions of modernity.  
Members of the upper-middle class and global cosmopolitan elite might 
envision their cities taking a great leap forward, into a future of gleaming 
glass hotels and flyover expressways.  Meanwhile, the construction workers 
who build the future (often while being housed in neighborhoods whose 
public services would not be out of place in an earlier century50) may envi-
sion a modern city as one that integrates and recognizes the needs of its 
working classes. 
The elite vision of a modern city without poverty has real and harmful 
consequences for the modern poor.  “Desperate to renew investments and 
project a positive image, localities attempt to beautify themselves, often 
displacing hundreds of thousands of residents in the process.”51  Normal 
rights-balancing considerations are suspended, and the urban poor are 
transformed from fellow citizens to a civic blight to be eliminated.  Once the 
urban poor are cast as “less,” they can be excluded from the decision-
making processes about the use of urban space, in turn facilitating policy 
decisions that allow elites to push them farther from the urban core.52  This 
makes efforts to access the decision-making bodies even more difficult, and, 
through factors like longer commutes to work and greater barriers to ac-
cessing public services, forces the poor to bear additional costs of poverty 
created through deepening socioeconomic segregation.  Modernity dis-
course around mega-events therefore becomes a justification for exclusion 
of the “unmodern,” and it allows the city to be reshaped in self-fulfilling 
ways that push both the homes and the political voices of the poor further 
toward the edges. 
 
                                                           
48. Id. 
49. Andranovich, Burbank & Heying, supra note 13, at 114. 
50. See, e.g., Photos: Labor in India, DENVER POST (Mar. 8, 2010), 
http://blogs.denverpost.com/captured/2010/03/08/in-focus-labor-in-india/1498/ (illustrat-
ing working and living conditions of the largely migrant construction labor force used to build 
the 2010 Commonwealth Games venues in Delhi, India). 
51. Yishai Blank, Localism in the New Global Legal Order, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 263, 273 (2006). 
52. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Broudehoux, Spectacular Beijing: the Conspicuous Construction of an 
Olympic Metropolis, 29 J. URB. AFFAIRS 383, 393 (2007) (“Olympic redevelopment exacerbated 
preexisting socio-spatial polarization, further disenfranchising Beijing’s new poor while allow-
ing its new rich to expand their control over the urban core.”).  For examples of the extra-legal 
tactics used to evict the poor from their homes, see, e.g., COHRE (2007), supra note 21 (use of 
“eviction squads” and tactics such as disconnecting utilities in order to force people out of 
their homes in advance of the Beijing Olympics). 
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 E. Transnational Alliances and Global Support for Mega-Events 
Exceptionalism 
 
While domestic rhetorical strategies described above can facilitate legal 
exceptionalism in the name of mega-events hosting, another factor is also 
often at play in shifting the local political debate: the interests of the inter-
national community.  Mega-events bring to bear the coercive power of the 
international elite and global organizations, which often have an institu-
tional orientation toward commercial profits (such as FIFA or the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee (“IOC”)) or top-down development (such as the 
World Bank or International Monetary Fund).53  The arrival of the interna-
tional community can create pressures in support of legal exceptionalism in 
three often-overlapping ways. 
First, sponsoring institutions may have concrete notions of which laws 
are necessary predicates to mega-events, and insist on their adoption as a 
condition of hosting.  These laws, typically designed to protect intellectual 
property or other commercial interests of a sponsoring organization,54 are 
often written by the international organization and adopted by the national 
or local government where the event is to take place.55  They are essentially 
contracts of adhesion, for in most cases a government must accept them 
wholesale or forego the opportunity to host the event. 
Second, the goals of international organizations are often aligned with 
those of local elites.  One of the attractions of a mega-event is that it may 
provide a pretext for enacting policies advantageous to local elites while es-
sentially allowing them to wash their hands of the reforms, both because of 
the apparent coercive power of the international organizations and because 
the fast-track deal-making may facilitate a period of secretive, behind-
closed-doors decision-making.56  Furthermore, mega-events allow local 
elites to assert their power within national politics: “mega-events are often 
a way in which rich and powerful cities manage to obtain state subsidies, 
demonstrating what Benvenisti describes as the way in which domestic in-
terest groups use the transnational arena to win over other domestic 
groups.”57 
Third, international organizations and the international community as a 
whole are often eager to see a successful event take place, whether because 
they believe it will facilitate an important meeting or out of a more general-
                                                           
53. See, e.g., World Bank: Uphold Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 15, 2012), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/15/world-bank-uphold-rights. 
54. See, e.g., Jessica Blumert, Note, Home Games: Legal Issues Concerning the Displacement of Prop-
erty Owners at the Site of Olympic Venues, 21 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 180-81 (2012). 
55. See, e.g., NETWORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES, supra note 3, at 12-14. 
56. See, e.g., COHRE (2007), supra note 21, at 198; see also Thomas A. Musil, The Sleeping Giant: 
Community Benefit Agreements and Urban Development 44 URB. LAW. 827, 839-42 (2012) (describ-
ing criticisms of municipal revenue-sharing agreements for large-scale facilities constructions 
in the United States as undemocratic and implemented without normal participatory proc-
esses). 
57. Blank, supra note 51, at 273 n.46 (citing Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globaliza-
tion, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 171-175 (1999)). 
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ized interest in promoting general global goodwill,58 even if it comes at the 
cost of normal legal protections. As a result, rights violations that would 
normally spark an uproar from the international community may go under-
reported and under-criticized.59 
The global nature of mega-events thus becomes important in justifying 
legal exceptionalism from two perspectives.  The perceived prestige, inter-
national media attention, and transnational alliances can tip local politics in 
favor of elite interests and provide the support necessary to sanction rapid 
legal changes.  And goodwill fostered by mega-event hosting may mute 
normal international criticism of those very same legal changes.  As the 
documentation of rights abuses in Part II shows, this international pressure 
contributes to violations of both domestic and international law.  However, 
as discussed further in Part III, the international character of mega-events 
and the purported goals of international unity and progress might also be 
harnessed to create a moral obligation within the international community 
to address such abuses.  International organizations are often immunized 
from suit in the countries where they work,60 typically making direct legal 
action against the sponsor organizations unfeasible.  But just as popular 
pressure can be mobilized to support legal exceptionalism, so too might it 
be brought to bear in support of greater rights protection.  Just as any 
analysis of harms must consider the role of the international community, so 
too should any prescriptions for reform. 
 
II. CASE STUDY: 2014 BRAZIL WORLD CUP AND 2016 RIO DE JANEIRO OLYMPIC 
GAMES  
 
Brazil will host the 2014 World Cup in twelve cities and the 2016 Sum-
mer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.  Although Brazilian civil society 
groups and ordinary citizens were excluded from many of the initial deci-
sion-making processes, a robust civil society network has since collected an 
impressive amount of information on processes, expenditures, and rights 
violations.  Civil society actors from the country’s host cities have orga-
nized a network of Comitês Populares da Copa (Popular Committees on 
the World Cup) and, in Rio, Comité Popular da Copa e das Olimpíadas (the 
Popular Committee on the World Cup and the Olympics),61 with meetings 
                                                           
58. See, e.g., Roche (2002), supra note 30, at 2 (“There are no comparable opportunities for cere-
monial and celebratory televisual evocations of 'globality' in conventional international politics 
around institutions such as the United Nations, which is possibly why the UN has been gener-
ally warm and positive in its relationship with the Olympic Movement in recent years.”). 
59. See, e.g., John Horne, The Four ‘Knowns’ of Sports Mega-Events, 26 LEISURE STUDIES 81, 86 
(2007) (arguing that popular enthusiasm for mega-events from politicians, developers, event 
boosters, and sometimes even scholars leads to willful ignorance about the known and, by this 
point, largely predictable adverse impacts of mega-events). 
60. See generally, e.g., AUGUST REINISCH, CHALLENGING ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS (2010) (describing obstacles to prevailing on legal 
claims against international organizations). 
61. PORTAL POPULAR DA COPA E DAS OLIMPÍADAS, http://www.portalpopulardacopa.org.br/ 
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that draw participants from local, national, and international NGOs; aca-
demics; and residents of communities affected by mega-events develop-
ment.  The national network of Comitês Populares released a 2012 report 
documenting various categories of human rights abuses, and they have 
worked with local communities to document ongoing rights issues associ-
ated with mega-events development.62  Given that the lack of transparency 
in host cities often precludes systemic documentation of rights abuses, this 
extensive documentation therefore makes Brazil an especially valuable case 
study.  It also reflects a broader limitation on generalizing from one coun-
try’s mega-events experience to others: patterns of mega-events develop-
ment also interact with country-specific factors.  For example, the fact that 
Brazil has a strong civil society and established democratic institutions sug-
gest that even more pervasive rights violations may be occurring in coun-
tries where such documentation and open reporting is more difficult.  
Brazil is no stranger to mega-event hosting.  To list only a few exam-
ples, Rio de Janeiro has hosted two major international environmental con-
ferences63 and the 2007 Pan-American Games.64  The southern port city of 
Porto Alegre has hosted six World Social Forums, beginning with the inau-
gural event in 2001, and the Amazonian city of Belém has hosted one.  In 
the early-to-mid twentieth century, Brazil hosted numerous international 
events as part of its state-building program, including its first World Cup in 
1950.  As in other countries, past mega-events have fundamentally re-
shaped Brazil’s host cities, deepening socio-spatial segregation.65  In their 
bid applications, however, state authorities argued that the 2014 and 2016 
events would provide opportunities for all Brazilians to enjoy the fruits of 
economic growth and infrastructure development.66  But citizen voices have 
been shut out of the conversation from the beginning,67 and evidence from 
the host cities suggests that not only has that exclusion led to a lack of pro-
poor development, it has also promoted a legal culture that undermines re-
spect for normal rights protections.  Just as physical “exclusion zones” are 
created around World Cup events to prevent unlicensed commercial activ-
ity in and around the host stadiums, this pattern effectively creates “law ex-
clusion zones” in which normal laws, including supposedly inviolable con-
                                                                                                                                         
(last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
62. NETWORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES, supra note 3. 
63. The city hosted the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment Development (“Earth 
Summit”), which resulted in Agenda 21, and the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustain-
able Development (“Rio+20”).  About Rio+20, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, http://www.uncsd2012.org/about.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
64. Martin Curi, Jorge Knijnik & Gilmar Mascarenhas, The Pan American Games in Rio de Janeiro 
2007: Consequences of a sport mega-event on a BRIC country, 46 INT’L REV. SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 
140, 140 (2011).  For the 2007 event, the city built a temporary wall to separate the venues from 
some of the nearby slums. Id. 
65. See, e.g., id.; Christopher Gaffney, Mega-Events and Socio-Spatial Dynamics in Rio de Janeiro, 
1919-2016, 9 J. LAT. AM. GEO. 7, 8 (2010). 
66. See, e.g., COMITÉ DE CANDIDATURA RIO 2016, DOSSIÊ DE CANDIDATURA DO RIO DE JANEIRO À 
SEDE DOS JOGOS 
OLÍMPICOS E PARAOLÍMPICOS DE 2016. RIO DE JANEIRO (2009), available at 
http://www.rio2016.org.br/sumarioexecutivo. 
67. NETWORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES, supra note 3, at 54-57. 
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stitutional and international human rights protections, can be and are ig-
nored.  The following section examines processes of citizen exclusion, se-
crecy, and exceptional lawmaking.  The case study then concludes with 
documentation of patterns of rights abuses stemming from this state of le-
gal exceptionalism. 
 
A. Violations of Participatory Rights: Processes of Exclusion 
The lack of public participation in mega-events planning has been 
widely documented, with respect to both the upcoming events in Brazil68 
and mega-events in general.69  Brazilian civil society organizations have 
noted that the democratic deficit surrounding mega-events, and the move 
toward more generalized authoritarianism under the pretext of event plan-
ning, is particularly troubling given the country’s long and recent history of 
dictatorship and the relative youth of its democratic institutions.70  This sec-
tion discusses three categories of participatory rights violations: the exclu-
sion of citizen voices from decision-making processes; the lack of publicly 
available material (and, in some cases, the deliberate dissemination of mis-
information); and the creation of systems of extraordinary governance for 
activities related to the upcoming events. 
First, average citizens and civil society groups routinely have been ex-
cluded from conversations about mega-events planning or the benefits they 
hope to secure for their own cities and communities.71  Members of com-
munities affected by displacements, for example, regularly are barred from 
discussions about their own fates and informed that they will be evicted 
only after the decision is already made.72  Conversations about the future of 
the host cities—including urban planning, transportation projects, and 
other decisions about the long-term legacy of the city—largely happened 
early and behind closed doors.73  The current focus of urban restructuring 
problems tends to reflect the problem of competing visions of modernity 
described in Part I.D, supra.  For example, city governments invest in rapid-
transit projects that displace the urban poor74 without providing adequate 
housing solutions for the very people whose labor supports urban expan-
sion.75  And government programs that are designed to facilitate participa-
                                                           
68. See, e.g., id. 
69. See, e.g., COHRE (2007), supra note 21, at 196-199; Greene, supra note 18, at 180-82; Hiller, 
supra note 33, at 452. 
70. Thomas Pegram, Brazil’s Upcoming “Mega-Events” Human Rights Legacy, UNIV. DENV.: HUM. 
RIGHTS & HUM. WELFARE (2011), http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/roundtable/2011/panel-
c/01-2012/pegram-2011c.html. 
71. NETWORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES, supra note 3, at 50-57. 
72. Id. at 12-14. 
73. Id. at 54-57. 
74. See, e.g., Felicity Clarke, Transcarioca: Irregularidades e Remoções em Obras Olímpicas [Tran-
scarioca: Irregularities and Evictions in Olympics Construction], RIOONWATCH (Nov. 21, 
2012), http://rioonwatch.org.br/?p=4018. 
75. See, e.g., NETWORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES, supra note 3, at 63. 
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tion often appear to be more about optics than hearing citizen voices; a 
purportedly government-funded program in Bahia, for example, designed 
to monitor the social legacy of the World Cup development projects, was 
announced “without a budget or specific projects.”76 
Second, even as taxpayer dollars subsidize World Cup and Olympic 
Games projects, information about the organizing committees and their ex-
penditures remains difficult to obtain.77  Citizens and civil society groups 
seeking information about the planning processes are often denied it, in 
violation of Brazilian and international law.78  Article 19 of the UNDHR 
protects the right to “freedom of opinion and expression”;79 this includes 
the right to access information necessary to inform one’s opinions, particu-
larly with respect to state activity.80  In Brazilian law, Article 37 of the Con-
stitution of 1988 requires state agencies to publicize their activities and 
mandates that dissemination of information “be of an educational, informa-
tive, or socially oriented nature.”81  Yet impediments to free speech and free 
expression are rampant, including restrictions on advertising and public-
ity,82 a lack of information about the government’s activities,83 and deliber-
ate misinformation designed to facilitate projects being undertaken outside 
of the normal legal rules, under the frameworks of legal exceptionalism.84  
The rights to information and participation are prerequisites to the full en-
joyment of all rights; thus, these violations constitute abuses in and of 
themselves and, as the following section shows, facilitate other human 
rights abuses. 
Third, exceptional governance processes are created to protect and fast-
track select interests, often at the expense of other citizens’ participatory 
rights.  For example, normal competitive bidding processes are circum-
vented under the pretext that decisions on mega-events construction must 
happen quickly in order to keep projects on schedule.85  Regular notice-and-
comment periods are curtailed.  Normal laws are presumed insufficient to 
protect the special interests of the international organizations and their 
                                                           
76. Karlo Dias, Bahia cria rede para monitorar legados sociais da Copa [Bahia creates a network to 
monitor social legacies of the World Cup], PORTAL 2014 (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://www.portal2014.org.br/noticias/8594/BAHIA+CRIA+REDE+PARA+MONITORAR+
LEGADOS+SOCIAIS+DA+COPA.html. 
77. See, e.g., Associated Press, Romario blasts Rio 2016 organizers, ESPN.COM (July 5, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/olympics/story/_/id/8131967/olympics-2016-romario-blasts-rio-
organizing-committee. 
78. NETWORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES, supra note 3, at 50-65. 
79. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res, 217 (111)A, art. 19, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(111) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
80. Human Rights Comm. Draft General Comment No. 34, 98th Sess., Mar. 8-27, 2010, ¶¶ 17-19, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.2 (2010). 
81. Constituição Federal de 1988 [Federal Constitution of 1988] art. 37 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm. 
82. Eduardo Bresciani, Entorno das arenas, o novo embate da Lei Geral da Copa 2014 [Around the 
stadiums, the new weight of the 2014 General Law of the Cup], O ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO (Nov. 14, 
2011), http://m.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,entorno-das-arenas-o-novo-embate-da-lei-
geral-da-r/copa-2014,798413.htm. 
83. NETWORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES, supra note 3, at 50-65. 
84. Id. at 19-22. 
85. See, e.g., id. at 59. 
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sponsors; for example, one proposed new law would create eight new cate-
gories of crimes, many of which could easily be prosecuted under normal 
laws.86  The new law would also create fast-track tribunals to expedite 
prosecution, literally creating a parallel system of justice for the mega-
events.87  
These special legal regimes are made possible through the convergence 
of, inter alia, the public authorities’ desire for a fast, orderly, and impressive 
events preparation process; the power imbalance in favor of the interna-
tional organizations organizing mega-events; popular support and media 
hype; and the financial motivations of multi-national corporate sponsors, 
powerful property developers, and other elite interests.  The regular laws, 
rights-balancing, and space-use arrangements become insufficient when 
mega-events arrive.  As a result, the upcoming mega-events have created 
opportunities for public authorities and elite interests to swoop in and abol-
ish existing laws or institute new regimes to govern speech, the use of pub-
lic space, employment, housing, and numerous other facets of life in ways 
that circumvent the normal decision-making processes and rights protec-
tions.  These violations of the right to public participation create a general 
climate of legal exceptionalism and lay the groundwork for the creation of 
broader “law exclusion zones” to come.  The following section discusses a 
few of the categories of human rights violations that arise as a consequence 
of the extraordinary legal regimes. 
 
B. Reshaping Cities, Reshaping Rights: Patterns of Substantive Rights 
Violations 
In the years leading up to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic 
Games, the climate of legal exceptionalism has allowed—and continues to 
allow—the systemic violation of rights normally protected under Brazilian 
law, as well as under the international human rights treaties to which Brazil 
is a party.  In some cases, these rights violations are a direct consequence of 
a mega-event planning process that discounts the voices of the poor and 
normal rights-balancing considerations; in other cases, they may be moti-
vated by long-standing goals of urban transformation or property devel-
opment and simply are facilitated by the legal climate created by the up-
coming mega-events.  In either case, under the extraordinary legal regimes 
created to facilitate these events, individuals have experienced violations of 
numerous rights, including the rights to housing, decent work, and full par-
ticipation in civic and cultural life. 
 
                                                           
86. PLS – Projeto de Lei do Senado, No. 728 de 2011 [hereinafter PLS 728/2011], available at 
http://www.senado.gov.br/atividade/materia/detalhes.asp?p_cod_mate=103652.  New 
categories of crimes include attacking an international delegate and falsifying entries or other 
documents related to the events.  For a procedural history of the bill,, see the “Tramitação” tab 
at the same URL. 
87. Id. 
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  1. Right to Housing 
Maria da Fátima, a long-time resident of the Rio de Janeiro community 
of Restinga, was at work when she heard that bulldozers were arriving to 
raze her home.  She raced home, arguing that she had not been warned or 
compensated, and that the demolition was unacceptable and illegal.  But 
her home, like the homes and small business of the 152 other families in the 
community, was destroyed to make way for the construction of new mega-
events venues.  Now, two years later, the community continues to fight for 
any sort of compensation while the displaced families struggle to make 
ends meet.88 
The right to housing is protected as part of the adequate standard of 
living under Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)89 and Article 25 of the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights (UNDHR),90 and the right to adequate housing was further 
affirmed under General Comment No. 4 of the UN Committee on Eco-
nomic, Cultural, and Social Rights.91  In addition, the UN Special Rappor-
teur on the right to adequate housing has recognized the need to take spe-
cial measures to protect against the heightened abuses that frequently take 
place during mega-events.92  Brazil also has a strong public and legal policy 
that allows many otherwise unused lands to be occupied, and sometimes 
adversely possessed, by people living in poverty.93  The Federal Constitu-
tion of 1988 recognizes housing as a fundamental right,94 and Brazil’s 
landmark 2001 City Statute codifies the social use of buildings and land as a 
public policy goal, creating specific procedures for regularizing title.95 
Despite the weight of international and national legal authorities in 
support of housing rights, displacements are perhaps the most pervasive, 
insidious, and well-documented form of mega-events-related rights viola-
tions.96  Although the Brazilian government has not kept comprehensive re-
                                                           
88. Priscila Néri, Witness, Video: O Legado Somos Nós: A História de Francisca [We Are the Legacy: 
The Story of Francisca], YOUTUBE (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=02aM4yWyRB4. 
89. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR], Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3.  The ICESCR was adopted through the United Nations General Assembly reso-
lution 2200A and entered into force on January 3, 1976. 
90. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res, 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
91. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 4, The right to ade-
quate housing, Sixth Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (1991). 
92. Special Rapporteur , Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the 
right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/13/20 (2009) (by Raquel Rolnik). 
93. Marc R. Poirier, Brazilian Regularization of Title in Light of Moradia, Compared to the United 
States Understandings of Homeownership and Homelessness, 44 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 259, 
273-76 (2013). 
94. Constituição Federal de 1988 [Federal Constitution of 1988] art. 6 (Braz.), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm. 
95. Lei No. 10.257 de 10 de julho de 2001 [Lei No. 10,257 of July 10, 2001), available at 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/leis_2001/l10257.htm. 
96. See id.; COHRE (2007), supra note 21; Greene, supra note 18. 
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cords on mega-events-related evictions, civil society groups estimate that 
construction and other activities related to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 
Olympic Games will involve the removal of hundreds of thousands of 
households.97  As of February 2014, human rights groups estimated that 
about 3,000 people had been evicted from Rio de Janeiro alone, with an-
other 200,000 at risk nationwide.98  Some communities are targeted because 
they obstruct places where mega-events venues or transportation projects 
are planned.  For example, members of an indigenous community, occupy-
ing an abandoned building that formerly served as Rio de Janeiro’s Indige-
nous Museum near Maracanã Stadium, were evicted—some in handcuffs—
to make way for a car park, part of the stadium’s $500 million renovation.99  
Other communities are at risk because the upcoming mega-events provide 
a pretext for authorities or developers to target low-income communities 
that they have long hoped to evict.100  Given the already substantial urban 
housing deficit facing the poor in Brazil,101 even people who are compen-
sated—typically at well below market value102—may struggle to find new 
housing.  Furthermore, evictions of communities where people have lived 
for years or even generations, and in which they have invested substantial 
resources and social capital, are disruptive to the broader social fabric and 
the stability of residents’ lives.103 
Residents link even some programs ostensibly designed to promote so-
cial inclusion to displacement efforts.  Brazil’s federal and municipal gov-
ernments have invested heavily in programs designed to address pervasive 
socioeconomic segregation, particularly in the state of Rio de Janeiro.104  
Perhaps the most famous are the Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora 
(“UPPs”), or Police Pacification Units, in which specially-trained police offi-
cers are dedicated to specific offices in Rio’s favelas, where they work simul-
taneously on eliminating drug trafficking and fostering positive relations 
with the local communities.105  The programs have had some media suc-
                                                           
97. NETWORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES, supra note 3, at 17-22. 
98. Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, As Brazil Gears Up for Olympics, Some Poor Families Get Moved Out, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/02/27/276514012/as-brazil-gears-up-for-
olympics-some-poor-families-get-moved-out. 
99. Alan Taylor, Brazilian Police Evict Indigenous Squatters from 2014 Stadium Site, THE ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2013/04/brazilian-police-evict-
indigenous-squatters-from-2014-stadium-site/100491/; Rio Police Evict Amazon Natives From 
World Cup Site, REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/22/us-
soccer-brazil-worldcup-eviction-idUSBRE92L0VG20130322. 
100. Interview with Orlando, Association of Residents of Dandara Housing Occupation, in Mi-
nas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil (Jul. 13, 2012). 
101. NETWORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES, supra note 3, at 9-10. 
102. Id. at 30. 
103. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET NO. 25: FORCED 
EVICTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 5, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet25en.pdf. 
104. See generally Maria Clara Dias & Luis Eslava, Horizons of Inclusion: Life Between Laws and 
Developments in Rio de Janeiro, 44 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 177 (2013) (projecting the effect of 
future mega-events on the city). 
105. Id. at 181-82. 
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cess,106 but community opinion about the new policing program remains 
unclear, and is likely divided.107  Although the initial emphasis of the UPPs 
was on community integration and relationship-building, those efforts have 
often given way to more traditional shows of force, including a 2010 police 
occupation of the Complexo do Alemão, a cluster of favelas in the north of 
the city that was “a true act of war.”108  As the 2014 World Cup and 2016 
Olympic Games approach, the emphasis appears to be shifting ever more to 
quelling violence at all costs,109 and some residents argue that the programs 
advertised to improve quality of life in the favelas are actually steps in a 
process of gentrification designed to displace—directly and indirectly—the 
long-time residents.110  
The lack of community consultation and the secretive and sudden na-
ture of the evictions frequently result in relocation processes that displace 
residents without respect for their legal rights.  Francisca, a head of house-
hold whose family was also displaced from the Rio de Janeiro neighbor-
hood of Restinga, explained, “They had to demolish the houses and the 
shops because they wanted to widen the Avenue of the Americas [a major 
highway]. . . . And they really did that, and we knew it had to be done, but 
what we have always questioned was the way they did it.  It just wasn’t 
fair.”111  In a press interview, for example, the Secretary of Housing said 
that Francisca’s family members were given jobs and other compensation 
when they were displaced, as the law requires.112  But Francisca responded 
that they were left with nothing: “So that’s wrong, it’s outrageous for them 
to say that people are being relocated within their rights—not true!  They 
are not; as far as I know, this is not happening.”113 
 
  2. Right to Decent Work 
 Broadly, mega-events in Brazil have contributed to two categories of 
violations of the right to decent work: violations of labor and workplace 
protections, and the displacement of informal workers who rely on public 
space to provide a livelihood for themselves and their families, often out of 
                                                           
106. See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo, In Rough Slum, Brazil’s Police Try Soft Touch, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
10, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/world/americas/11brazil.html 
(describing the work of Brazil’s “peace police,” with a lead photograph featuring three uni-
formed policemen playing with children in a favela day care). 
107. Dias & Eslava, supra note 104, at 188-89. 
108. Id. at 190. 
109. See, e.g., Brazil: Rio de Janeiro Asks for Help to Fight Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2014), avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/world/americas/brazil-rio-de-janeiro-asks-for-
help-to-fight-crime.html. 
110. Owen Gibson & Jonathan Watts, World Cup: Rio favelas being “socially cleansed” in runup to 
sporting events, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/05/world-cup-favelas-socially-cleansed-
olympics. 
111. Néri, supra note 88, at 8:35-8:53. 
112. Id. at 9:05-9:38. 
113. Id. at 9:38-9:44. 
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necessity rather than choice.114 
Articles 6-7 of the ICESCR protect the right to work,115 and General 
Comment No. 18 clarifies that this means the right to decent work.116  Con-
ventions from the International Labour Organization guarantee a wide 
range of labor rights, including fundamental rights of collective bargain-
ing.117  Under the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, the right to work is protected, 
and the state is obligated to take steps to promote its availability.118  Decent, 
safe, and healthy working conditions are guaranteed under Brazil’s Con-
solidated Labor Laws (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho).119 
With respect to formal workers, the argument that extraordinary meas-
ures are necessary to complete promised construction projects in time has 
been used to justify end-runs around normal workplace protections, includ-
ing questionable safety standards and laws curtailing the right to engage in 
protected concerted activities like strikes and labor organizing.  Shortly af-
ter a construction accident killed two workers at the World Cup stadium 
site of Itaquerão, in a São Paulo suburb—the third fatal construction acci-
dent at one of the country’s World Cup stadiums120—FIFA warned that 
Brazil would need to step up the pace of its construction and, according to 
one article, “threatened to force round-the-clock construction in order to 
ensure all stadiums were done on time.”121  And Brazil’s track record on 
construction fatalities is not among the worst; Greece and Beijing saw four-
teen and ten construction fatalities, respectively, in their Olympic Games 
preparations, and, as of February 2014, a shocking 400 Nepalese construc-
tion workers had died on 2022 World Cup projects in Qatar.122  But rather 
than strengthening workers’ rights in the face of such a human cost, legal 
changes proposed in advance of the mega-events aim to weaken them.  
A law currently pending in Brazil’s Senate, for example, PLS 728/11, 
                                                           
114. For a discussion of how vending often functions as a livelihood of last resort, see Kamala 
Sankaran, The Human Right to Livelihood: Recognizing the Right to Be Human, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 81 (2012). 
115. ICESCR, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.  
116. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18 on the Right to 
Work (Art. 6 of the ICESCR), ¶7, UN ESCOR, 35th Sess., Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc 
E/C.12/GC/18 (Nov. 24, 2005). 
117. See International Labour Conference, June 1998, ILO Declaration of Fundamental Princi-
ples and Rights at Work 2(a), 37 I.L.M. 1237, available at http:// 
www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc86/com-dtxt.htm (describing the free-
dom of association and collective bargaining protected under ILO Convention Nos. 87 and 98 
as fundamental rights binding on all ILO member states). 
118. Constituição Federal de 1988 [Federal Constitution of 1988] art. 6-11, 170 (Braz.), available 
at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm. 
119. Decreto-Lei no. 5.452 de 1 de maio de 1943 [Law Decree No. 5,452 of May 1, 1943], as 
amended (Braz.), available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto-lei/del5452.htm. 
120. Two Die in Brazil World Cup Stadium Accident, BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-25127897. 
121. Tim Newcomb, Crane Falls at Brazil World Cup Stadium, Killing Two, POPULAR MECHANICS 
(Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.popularmechanics.com/outdoors/sports/news/crane-falls-at-
brazil-world-cup-stadium-killing-three-16205941. 
122. Sophie McBain, 400 Nepalese Construction Workers Have Died Since Qatar Won the World Cup 
Bid, NEWSTATESMAN (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.newstatesman.com/global-
issues/2014/02/400-nepalese-construction-workers-have-died-qatar-won-world-cup-bid. 
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would restrict the right to strike before and during the upcoming events.123  
It would require workers to give 15 days advance notice before a strike, en-
sure that 70 percent of the workforce was still available, and allow employ-
ers to hire replacement workers,124 in effect nullifying any power of a strike 
at all. Normal prohibitions on the use of volunteer labor for for-profit en-
terprises are being lifted at FIFA’s request, and at the expense of Brazilian 
workers.125  As international authorities demand fair play on the field, the 
normal rules of fair business and labor-market competition in the work-
place are suspended. 
Just as the upcoming sporting events are being overlaid onto a long-
running conflict between informal settlements and property speculators, so 
too are they affecting informal workers.  In Belo Horizonte, for example, 
displaced vendors reported that at least 150 families suffered hardships as a 
result of displacement from the historic Minerão stadium,126 even though 
vendors were an important part of the social and cultural fabric of the city 
and had long contributed to the enjoyment of other users’ space.127  Certain 
changes to the regulation of public space will often be necessary to accom-
modate the additional people and activities associated with mega-events.  
But the changes underway in many host cities exclude users of public space 
themselves from the conversations.  These participatory restrictions thus 
lead not to negotiations about maximizing the social value of, and rights 
protections in, public space, but to the unilateral imposition of conditions 
that infringe upon the rights of some of the country’s poorest citizens to ac-
cess a livelihood of last resort for their families. 
 
  3. Right to Participate in Civic and Cultural Life 
On thirteen out of every fourteen days, Janaina rises at 3:45 in the 
morning.128  She sweeps, puts on her make-up, lays the table with bread 
and instant chocolate mix for her children, and boards a bus for the two 
hour journey that takes her from her family’s home in a Rio de Janeiro sub-
urb near Nova Iguaçu to the chic Zona Sul neighborhood of Lagoa, where 
she works as a domestic worker.  The bus is full of her friends and neigh-
bors making the daily commute from the suburbs, where the fruits of the 
country’s economic miracle are slow to arrive, to the beachfront neighbor-
hoods where the city’s rich live.  The Zona Sul is experiencing a major 
boom, fueled in part by the boost the city expects from the upcoming mega-
events. 
Janaina recognizes most of the people on the bus and introduces me, 
                                                           
123. PLS 728/2011, supra note 86. 
124. Id. 
125. “Lei Geral da Copa,” Lei No 12.661 (June 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.in.gov.br/imprensa/visualiza/index.jsp?jornal=1&pagina=3&data=06/06/2012. 
126. Interview with Ernani Francisco Pereira, President, Association of Vendors of Minerão 
Stadium, in Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil (Jul. 12, 2012). 
127. Interview with Fidélis Alcântara, supra note 5. 
128. At the interviewee’s request, the name and several identifying details have been changed. 
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explaining where they work.  Many others also work in rich homes – as 
cooks, housecleaners, nannies, and caregivers to the elderly.  Two are 
McDonald’s employees (but they explain that they are now angling for jobs 
at a new Burger King, which is currently in only a few upscale neighbor-
hoods and therefore considered more desirable).  Except for one of the 
teenage McDonald’s employees, a pair of security guards, and a man who 
works as a household driver, the passengers near us are all women; in an-
other hour, Janaina explains, there will be a wave of construction workers—
mostly men—and so she prefers this earlier bus. 
We connect to a more central bus, where Janaina points out other peo-
ple who work in grocery stores, in malls, or as “propaganda girls” who 
hand out advertising material on the street.  The city’s growth has slowed 
Janaina’s commute; while the city is investing in transportation near the 
touristic center, her buses now are caught in traffic jams almost daily.  The 
return trip can take upwards of three hours.  Her employers have a small 
room where she and the family’s two other employees can sleep if they 
wish, and, increasingly, she uses it.129 
Janaina’s city is changing, and she is bearing the costs.  Even as she and 
her neighbors provide the human capital that sustains the city, they have 
no voice in what its World Cup and Olympic legacy will be.  The new ven-
ues that are being built are so far from Janaina’s house that they may as 
well be in a different city.  After a massive taxpayer-funded overhaul of the 
city’s historic soccer stadium, the venue—up to now, always public—will 
be run by a private consortium for the next 35 years.130  Janaina’s two sons 
likely will never play in the new soccer facilities.  Indeed, as the cost of liv-
ing in the city skyrockets,131 she imagines she may never even be able to 
take them to watch an event there.  Her daughter, a diligent student who 
had hoped to study medicine, has recently been confronted with the harsh 
reality of educational inequality as she struggles to prepare for university 
entrance exams.  Janaina mentions a plaque she saw on a hotel, reading: 
“This is a project of the Brazilian Development Bank.”  Every government 
dollar that went to that hotel, she notes, is a dollar that did not go to im-
proving the quality of her daughter’s education.132 
The social protests that broke out in Brazil in 2013, initially prompted 
by a proposed fare hike on São Paulo’s buses, spread to other cities in part 
because of widespread frustration about public exclusion from the multi-
billion dollar national World Cup redevelopment.133  The exclusion of citi-
zen voices from the decision-making processes has distributional conse-
quences that are often deeper and more pervasive than is immediately ap-
                                                           
129. Interviews with “Janaina,” domestic worker, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Jul. 4-7, 2012). 
130. Brazil’s Maracana Stadium “Privatised” Ahead of World Cup, BBC NEWS (May 9, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22476535. 
131. See, e.g., Thiago Jansen, Invasão estrangeira na favela, O GLOBO (Nov. 24, 2012), 
http://oglobo.globo.com/blogs/prosa/posts/2012/11/24/invasao-estrangeira-na-favela-
476302.asp. 
132. Interviews with Janaina, supra note 129. 
133. H.J., The Streets Erupt, THE ECONOMIST (June 18, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2013/06/protests-brazil. 
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parent.  Many of the arguments that have erupted over the right to housing, 
the right to occupy traditional workplaces, and increased police presence in 
the downtown favelas that have crystallized around Brazil’s mega-events 
may “at bottom reflect[] struggles over land use law and policy as well as 
the social dimensions of those laws and policies.”134  Tax dollars used to 
subsidize mega-events projects are dollars not spent elsewhere, creating 
very real impediments to the realization of social and economic rights like 
health and education.135  New transportation networks will reshape the city, 
circumscribing job opportunities and imposing new costs on the workers 
who must travel.  The environmental impact of projects, which should 
normally be considered as an important balancing factor in deciding 
whether and how to implement such projects, are often ignored.136  Civil so-
ciety groups, particularly in the Northeast, are concerned that a diversion of 
state security resources toward containing communities afflicted by vio-
lence and protecting stadiums is distracting from another security concern: 
the increase in human trafficking projected to accompany the World Cup.137  
By removing representative public participation from the decision-making 
processes surrounding mega-events planning, the interests represented in 
any rights- and resources-balancing discussions necessarily shift.  And 
mega-events become literal and figurative zones of exclusion, sites where 
regular laws no longer must be respected.  As a result, the long-term legacy 
of the events risks being one that undermines, rather than enhances, the full 
realization of human rights in the host cities. 
 
III. CONCLUSION: TOWARD CITIES, SPORT, AND DEVELOPMENT FOR ALL 
 
Any discussion of a more rights-protective mega-events framework 
must include two steps: (1) what a rights-protective framework looks like, 
and (2) how it can be implemented and protected during a moment of 
mega-event exceptionalism. 
International legal authorities and civil society observers have already 
spoken extensively on the “what.”138  The basic goal is simply a mega-
events process that respects normal democratic decision-making processes; 
holds events planners to the standards of international and national human 
rights law; includes the voices of affected communities in conversations 
                                                           
134. Colin Crawford, Order, Progress and Carioca Environments: A Preface to Study Space V, 44 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 139, 140 (2013). 
135. One news report covering the 2013 protests reported that a demonstrator carried a placard 
reading, “First-world stadiums; third-world schools and hospitals.”  The Streets Erupt, supra 
note 133. 
136. Interview with Rosa Pinheiro, Architect/Urban Planner, Comité Popular da Copa Natal, 
in Natal, Rio Grande do Norte (Aug. 13, 2012). 
137. Interview with Claudia Gazzola, Co-Director, Coletivo Leila Diniz, in Natal, Rio Grande 
do Norte (Aug. 15, 2012). 
138. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur, supra note 92; NETWORK OF POPULAR COMMITTEES, supra note 
3. 
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about their own fates, and ordinary citizens in conversations about the host 
city’s mega-events legacy; and considers rights as well as profits.  In short, 
the end goal is not greater rights protection during mega-events than dur-
ing other times, but simply the same level or respect for rights—an absence 
of “law exclusion zones.” 
The far more challenging question is how to preserve respect for normal 
democratic rules in the moments leading up to mega-events.  Such events 
provide opportunities for local elite interests to reframe domestic political 
debates in ways that erode rights protections for average citizens.  As dis-
cussed in Part I, supra, the glare of the international spotlight, the excite-
ment about a host city’s emergence onto the world stage, and the interna-
tional community’s interest in smooth and orderly event management all 
combine to tilt the balance of political will toward “order and progress,” 
even as it simultaneously tilts it away from processes of rights balancing 
and public debate.  Mega-events present moments of intense opportunity 
for certain interest groups, both national and international, and it seems 
highly unrealistic to simply call upon actors presented with such opportu-
nity to adhere to best practices of democratic decision-making and respect 
for rights. 
In light of three key factors that contribute to legal exceptionalism 
around mega-events—(1) popular enthusiasm and the global spotlight, (2) 
transnational alliances of elite interests, and (3) the creation of special legal 
regimes—the most successful strategies are likely to: (1) use the same inter-
national spotlight to frame attention around human rights issues, (2) use 
transnational civil society alliances to learn from past mega-events experi-
ences, and (3) use existing legal mechanisms to hold governments and in-
ternational organizations to account, even in moments of mega-event 
preparation. 
Civil society groups have already developed national and transnational 
networks to share experiences and identify common interests across bor-
ders.  For example, the Comitês Populares da Copa in Brazil have coordi-
nated civil society actions in advance of mega-events within and across the 
country, and an international network of street vendors created the World 
Class Cities for All Campaign in response to workplace evictions in South 
Africa.139  These transnational networks have had some success in elevating 
the visibility of human rights violations, particularly, in the case of Brazil, 
housing evictions.  Their strategies have included ensuring that rights vio-
lations are visible even when the victims are physically displaced from 
touristic centers140 and creating national and international networks of af-
fected people to highlight the systemic nature of such violations and learn 
from past events.141  By turning the international spotlight toward this side 
of mega-events, civil society groups can appeal to host cities’ desire to put 
their best foot forward by showing that the glare of the world eye will 
judge not only the height of a city’s skyscrapers, but also the plight of their 
                                                           
139. Id. 
140. See, e.g., Néri, supra note 88. 
141. See, e.g., Wintour, supra note 39. 
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poor.  
But, in the face of a mega-events juggernaut, awareness and local mobi-
lization have their limits.  Despite increased international media coverage, 
for example, evictions in Brazil appear to be going forward.  Another piece 
of the campaign will likely need to be a multi-stage effort to bring rights 
and rights protections into the international institutional conversation about 
mega-events.  There is some precedent for that, particularly if international 
organizations perceive that there is global support for such a shift.  FIFA, 
for example, has promoted “green stadiums,” and Brazil was required to 
obtain LEED certification for its stadiums as a condition of hosting the 
World Cup.142  Although the project has experienced its own share of criti-
cism,143 it also contributes to a more socially-conscious mega-events dis-
course and reflects the international community’s valorization of environ-
mental objectives.  A recent report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Adequate Housing offers one particularly useful building block for 
integrating rights protections during mega-events into the international 
human rights conversation.144  But past experience suggests that this is 
likely to be a slow process.  One potential model is the growing emphasis 
on the right to participatory development; international development insti-
tutions largely began with a top-down model of development and later 
adopted some “soft law” principles on participatory development, but 
those principles have yet to attain the status of customary international 
law.145  But the gradual internationalization of rights frameworks into inter-
national mega-event sponsoring organizations like FIFA, while not an im-
mediate solution, may be one of the most practical. 
In the meantime, while international legal mechanisms for rights pro-
tections in mega-events remain underdeveloped, and popular advocacy 
campaigns do not always go far enough, a third avenue remains: advocat-
ing for specific rights in local, national, and sometimes international courts.  
Combined with popular advocacy and advocacy within international spon-
soring organizations, this strategy has the potential to further normalize 
protection of basic rights during mega-events.  When mega-events laws 
conflict with the national constitution—or, in some cases, international trea-
ties to which a state is party—national courts may still provide some oppor-
tunity for redress.  Even where litigation may not fully guarantee rights, it 
is a strategy for bringing the “law exclusion zones” into the realm of legal 
accountability, and pushing back on the idea of mega-events sites as minia-
ture embassies, exempt from national law.  
The characteristics of mega-events make them particularly susceptible 
to legal exceptionalism.  By letting large and powerful institutions operate 
within, and change, domestic law without the threat of any legal conse-
quences, mega-events risk creating cultures and spaces of impunity that ex-
                                                           
142. Thomas J. Grant, Jr., Comment: Green Monsters: Examining the Environmental Impact of 
Sports Stadiums, 25 VILL. ENVT’L L.J. 149, 167 (2014). 
143. Id. at 168-73. 
144. Rolnik, supra note 92. 
145. Martin V. Totaro, Legal Positivism, Constructivism, and International Human Rights Law: The 
Case for Participatory Development, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 719, 737 (2008). 
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tend beyond the stadiums and into the lives of everyday citizens.  The pres-
ence of such “law exclusion zones” undermines the legitimacy of all law by 
suggesting that exceptional moments are cause for exceptional laws, and 
hollowing out rights protections in the moments when they are needed 
most.  In light of the transnational character of most mega-events, the em-
phasis on legal protections during mega-events will likely need to come 
from a multiplicity of actors, ranging from grassroots organizers to institu-
tional bodies.  An important first step is, in moments of mega-events plan-
ning, simply to hold accountable policymakers and institutions that nor-
mally espouse respect for rights, but that may be caught up in the 
enthusiasm and sense of urgency that surround a mega-event.  To create 
meaningful rights protections, both national and international law must ex-
tend to those places where the temptation of lawlessness is strongest.   
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